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DON’T DO THE CRIME IF YOU EVER INTEND TO VOTE 
AGAIN:1 CHALLENGING THE DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF EX-
FELONS AS CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 
Mark E. Thompson 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Meet Joe Smith.  Joe lives in Richmond, Virginia with his wife 
and two young sons.  He teaches history in the local high school.  
Like many classrooms throughout the nation, Joe’s class watched with 
interest as the 2000 presidential election2 unfolded.  As he fielded 
questions from his students about dangling chads and butterfly 
ballots, Joe was caught off guard by a question from one student, who 
asked, “Mr. Smith, who did you vote for?” 
The question presented a dilemma for the history teacher, who 
had repeatedly stressed the importance of the right to vote to his 
students.  You see, Joe himself had never cast a ballot.  In 1969, Joe 
was drafted for military service but, due to religious beliefs and a 
conscientious opposition to military action of any kind, he refused to 
report for his assignment.3  This decision resulted in a conviction for 
violation of the Selective Service Act,4 for which Joe served one year 
in prison.  Rather than truthfully answering the student’s question 
and appearing hypocritical, Joe chose instead to lecture the class 
about the impropriety of such a question. 
In the United States, participation in the electoral process is 
considered “vital to the maintenance of [our] democratic 
 
 1 SAMMY DAVIS JR., BARETTA’S THEME (KEEP YOUR EYE ON THE SPARROW) (Leeds 
Music Corporation 1975). 
 2 See generally Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (detailing the complications that 
arose in Florida during the 2000 Presidential election). 
 3 Joe’s hypothetical scenario is based on the facts of Otsuka v. Hite, 414 P.2d 412 
(Cal. 1966).  The plaintiffs in Otsuka had been convicted of failing to report for 
military service during World War II.  Id. at 414-15.  Twenty years after their release 
from prison, the plaintiffs, who in all other respects were qualified to vote, were 
refused voter registration due to their previous felony convictions.  Id. at 415. 
 4 50 U.S.C. § 456(j) (2001). 
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institutions.”5  Once viewed as a privilege granted by the state,6 the 
“right” to vote has been continuously expanded over the last 150 
years through constitutional amendments,7 legislative action,8 and 
judicial opinions.9  The thrust of this expansion is that certain 
restrictions on the right to vote can no longer be tolerated in a 
society based on democratic principles.10  This expansionist view of 
the franchise, however, has not been entirely extended to ex-felons, 
who remain permanently excluded from the electoral process in nine 
states.11 
Joe is but one of 1.4 million Americans that cannot vote12 
because of their status as an ex-felon.13  Despite having paid his debt 
 
 5 Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965) (quoting Schneider v. New Jersey, 
308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939)). 
 6 Special Project, The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. 
REV. 929, 974 (1970) [hereinafter Collateral Consequences]. 
 7 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XV (ensuring the vote regardless of race, color, or 
condition of servitude); U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (extending suffrage to women); 
U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV (abolishing the poll tax in federal elections). 
 8 See, e.g., Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (2001) (ensuring 
minorities access to the franchise). 
 9 See cases cited infra note 14. 
 10 See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (finding a law 
limiting school district elections to “property taxpayers” and parents of enrolled 
school children impermissible); Dunn v. Blumenstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) 
(declaring Tennessee’s durational residency requirement for voting violative of equal 
protection). 
 11 The constitutions and/or statutory provisions of the following nine states 
preclude ex-felons from voting.  ALA. CONST. art. VIII; FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4; FLA. 
STAT. ch. 97.041 (2001); IOWA CONST. art. II, § 5; IOWA CODE § 48A.6 (2001); KY. 
CONST. § 145; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 116.025 (Michie 2001); MISS. CONST. art. 12, § 
241; MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-11 (2001); NEV. CONST. art. 2, § 1; TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-
2-102 (2001); VA. CONST. art. II, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. 6, § 6; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-10-
106 (Michie 2001). 
 12 Approximately 3.9 million citizens are denied the right to vote as the result of a 
felony conviction.  Patricia Allard & Marc Mauer, Regaining the Vote: An Assessment of 
Activity Relating to Felon Disenfranchisement Laws, at http://www.sentencingproject.org 
(last visited Aug. 5, 2002).  Approximately 1.4 million of these citizens reside in states 
that extend the denial of suffrage to citizens that have completed their term of 
incarceration.  Id.  This approximation of disenfranchised ex-felons may be slightly 
lower, as New Mexico restored the franchise to ex-felons as of July 1, 2001.  N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 31-13-1 (Michie 2001). 
 13 “Ex-felon,” as used throughout this Comment, refers to citizens who have 
completed their term of incarceration or have otherwise satisfied their sentence for 
conviction of a crime.  This Comment focuses on the disenfranchisement of ex-
felons and does not challenge the disenfranchisement of felons who are still under 
some form of state supervision.  Although the distinction this Comment draws 
between the disenfranchisement felons and ex-felons may seem tenuous, states do 
have seemingly legitimate, non-punitive reasons for denying the vote to those still 
under state supervision.  See, e.g., Steve Chapman, Give Ex-Convicts the Vote: It’s a Crime 
to Deny Offenders Their Full Rights of Citizenship (March 30, 2000), at 
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to society and leading an exemplary life since his infraction at the age 
of eighteen, Joe cannot help but feel like a sub-citizen come election 
day.  As fellow citizens freely exercise this “fundamental” right,14 Joe 
must idly sit by, watching as others choose those who will govern him 
and the laws by which he must obey.  Alienation and embarrassment 
lead to confusion15 as he wonders why he is not allowed to do 
something that textbooks call a fundamental right.  He asks, “is this 
punishment for something I did years ago, and, if so, isn’t that 
punishment cruel and unusual?” 
In light of the fundamental nature of the right to vote,16 as well 
as the unconvincing non-penal justifications espoused for denying 
this right to persons no longer under state supervision,17 this 
Comment proposes that the disenfranchisement of ex-felons 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment as proscribed by the 
Eighth Amendment.18 
An individual wishing to establish that such disenfranchisement 
is cruel and unusual punishment must demonstrate the following.  
First, because the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause applies 
only to “punishment,” the individual must demonstrate that 
disenfranchisement is, in fact, additional punishment for the 
commission of a crime and not simply a regulatory measure enacted 
for a legitimate, non-punitive purpose.19  Once established as 
 
http://slate.msn.com/default.aspx?id=78066 (citing problems in determining the 
inmate’s residence for election purposes); Collateral Consequences, supra note 6, at 978 
(discussing the unavailability of election machinery and absentee ballots in prisons).  
In light of these justifications, this Comment does not challenge the constitutionality 
of disenfranchising felons that have yet to complete their sentences. 
 14 Numerous decisions have espoused the fundamental nature of the right to 
vote.  See, e.g., Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 676 (1966) (“[t]he 
right to vote is . . . precious, . . . fundamental . . . .”); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 
555 (1964) (“The right to vote freely for the candidate of one’s choice is of the 
essence of a democratic society . . . .”); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) 
(the right to vote is fundamental “because [it is] preservative of all rights”) 
(alteration added). 
 15 See generally Alice E. Harvey, Comment, Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement and its 
Influence on the Black Vote: The Need For a Second Look, U. PA. L. REV. 1145, 1170-73 
(1994) (discussing in detail the psychologically detrimental effects on the individual 
disqualified from voting); Collateral Consequences, supra note 6, at 1174 (discussing the 
emotional impact that civil disabilities such as disenfranchisement often produce).  
For a more detailed discussion of the psychological effects that disenfranchisement 
has on the ex-felon, see infra notes 73-80 and accompanying text. 
 16 See cases cited supra note 14. 
 17 For a complete discussion of the purported non-penal justifications for ex-
felon disenfranchisement, see infra PART III. 
 18 “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel 
and unusual punishments inflicted.”  U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 19 See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 (1977) (finding the Cruel and 
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punishment, the individual must further establish that the denial of 
voting rights falls within the characterization of methods of 
punishment that are cruel and unusual.20 
The idea that disenfranchisement may constitute cruel and 
unusual punishment is by no means novel.  In 1966, the California 
Supreme Court stated that if a law disenfranchising ex-felons were 
intended as additional punishment for the commission of a crime, 
then “such . . . punishment . . . is of doubtful constitutionality . . . .”21  
While the United States Supreme Court has never examined the 
merits of such a claim,22 lower courts have heard challenges to ex-
felon disenfranchisement as cruel and unusual punishment.23  These 
challenges have been summarily dismissed, however, as the courts 
either refused to recognize disenfranchisement as a form of 
punishment,24 or misinterpreted the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
 
Unusual Punishments Clause inapplicable to disciplinary paddling of students 
because scholastic discipline is not punishment for Eighth Amendment purposes). 
 20 See, e.g., Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 450 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 
389 U.S. 1048 (1968) (stating that even if disenfranchisement was imposed as an 
additional punishment for the commission of a crime, “the framers of the Bill of 
Rights would not have regarded it as cruel and unusual”). 
 21 Otsuka v. Hite, 414 P.2d 412, 416 (Cal. 1966).  While not stating why such 
punishment would likely be unconstitutional, the court cited to Trop v. Dulles, 356 
U.S. 86 (1958), where the Supreme Court held that denaturalization was a form of 
cruel and unusual punishment.  Id.  It seems that Otsuka was implying that, like 
denaturalization, disenfranchisement would violate the Eighth Amendment if 
imposed as punishment.  See id; see also Dillenburg v. Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222, 1224 
(9th Cir. 1972) (observing that the characterization of disenfranchisement as 
punishment “creates its own constitutional difficulties”). 
 22 The Supreme Court did issue a summary affirmance in Fincher v. Scott, 411 U.S. 
961 (1973), aff’g 352 F. Supp. 117 (M.D.N.C. 1972), where the district court denied 
the plaintiff’s cruel and unusual challenge to North Carolina’s disenfranchisement 
law.  Fincher, 352 F. Supp. at 119-20.  The plaintiff, however, in Fincher relied primarily 
on Fourteenth Amendment equal protection, and the lower court’s treatment of his 
cruel and unusual punishment claim was limited to one paragraph at the end of the 
opinion.  Id. at 118-20.  Moreover, the Court has stated “summary affirmances are 
obviously not of the same precedential value as would be an opinion of this Court 
treating the question on the merits.”  Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 83 (1974) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting); cf. Dillenburg v. Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 
1972) (stating that a summary affirmance by the Supreme Court is of “very little 
precedential significance”). 
 23 See, e.g., Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 
U.S. 1048 (1968); Farrakhan v. Locke, 987 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D. Wash. 1997); 
Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (three-judge court). 
 24 See, e.g., Green, 380 F.2d at 450 (stating that disenfranchisement is not 
punishment); Kronlund, 327 F. Supp. at 74 (same).  In both Greene and Kronlund, the 
courts incorrectly cited Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), as holding that 
disenfranchisement is not punishment.  See Green, 380 F.2d at 450; Kronlund, 327 F. 
Supp. at 74.  This was not the holding of Trop, however, as the issue of felon 
disenfranchisement was not before the Court.  For a detailed discussion of the 
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Richardson v. Ramirez25 as granting constitutional immunity to ex-felon 
disenfranchisement.26  Thus, any conclusion that the Eighth 
Amendment does not forbid the disenfranchisement of ex-felons is 
grounded upon unsteady precedent. 
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of the exclusion of 
ex-felons from the franchise throughout the nation.  This Part begins 
with a brief history of disenfranchisement and examines the state 
provisions that deny the vote to ex-felons, 27 along with the effect that 
such laws have upon both the ex-felon and the community.  Part II 
documents the various, but infrequent, challenges to 
disenfranchisement.28  Part III analyzes whether disenfranchisement 
is a non-penal regulation, enacted to protect the purity of the ballot 
box,29 or a form of additional punishment that accompanies a felony 
conviction.30  This Comment proposes that the only plausible 
 
Supreme Court’s decision in Trop, see infra PART III. 
 25 418 U.S. 24 (1974).  Richardson involved a Fourteenth Amendment equal 
protection challenge to California’s disenfranchisement provision.  Id. at 26.  The 
Court held that the disenfranchisement of ex-felons is not violative of the Equal 
Protection Clause.  Id. at 56.  See infra notes 120-34 and accompanying text for a 
detailed discussion of Richardson. 
 26 In Farrakhan, 987 F. Supp. at 1314, the court noted that the “language in 
Richardson suggests that the facial validity of felon disenfranchisement may be 
absolute.”  While the language in Richardson may suggest that the validity of 
disenfranchisement is absolute, the holding most certainly did not.  See Richardson, 
418 U.S. at 26-27. 
 27 See supra note 11. 
 28 Felon disenfranchisement has been challenged as violative of Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) 
(holding that section two of the Fourteenth Amendment allows states to deny the 
vote to those convicted of “participation in rebellion, or other crime”) (quoting U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV, § 2); as violative of The Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 
1971, e.g., Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding Tennessee’s 
disenfranchisement of felons did not violate Voting Rights Act); and as violative of 
the First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments, e.g., Farrakhan v. Locke, 987 F. Supp 1304, 
1314 (E.D. Wash. 1997) (summarily disposing of First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment 
challenges to disenfranchisement in light of Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 
(1974)). 
 29 See, e.g., Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 450 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 
389 U.S. 1048 (1968) (stating that disenfranchisement is not a punishment, but 
merely a state’s regulation of the franchise); Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 582, 585 
(1884) (stating that “[t]he manifest purpose [of disenfranchisement] is to preserve 
the purity of the ballot box . . . .”).  But cf., Dillenburg v. Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222, 1224 
(9th Cir. 1972) (observing that “courts have been hard pressed to define the state 
interest served by laws disenfranchising persons convicted of crimes”). 
 30 Both Delaware and New Jersey expressly provide that the loss of the franchise 
is additional punishment for those convicted of a crime.  DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2; N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 19:4-1 (West 2001).  Other states that disavow a punitive purpose for 
disenfranchisement nevertheless locate those provisions amongst their penal, rather 
than election, statutes, intimating that disenfranchisement is intended as a punitive 
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rationale underlying disenfranchisement is the infliction of 
additional punishment on those convicted of crime.  Part IV 
examines Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and concludes that, as 
punishment, the permanent exclusion of ex-felons from the franchise 
is cruel and unusual when measured by “evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”31 
I.  OVERVIEW OF DISENFRANCHISEMENT 
A.  History of Civil Disabilities. 
Disenfranchisement in the United States is a vestige of ancient 
Greece and Rome, where a pronouncement of “infamy” entailed the 
loss of one’s right to participate in the functioning of the city state.32  
As citizenship was highly coveted during this period, the imposition 
of these civil disabilities33 was a logical and effective means of 
restraining criminal behavior.34  Similar practices were introduced 
throughout Europe with the rise of the Roman Empire.35 
The English adopted a comparable version of civil disabilities in 
the form of outlawry,36 and later, attainder.37  The offender’s criminal 
act was viewed as a declaration of war on the community.38  The 
community, therefore, was justified in avenging the criminal act by 
any means it felt necessary.39  Generally, this meant death for the 
 
measure.  See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-13-1 (Michie 2001); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-10-
106 (Michie 2001).  Courts have also recognized the punitive purpose and effect of 
disenfranchisement.  See, e.g., Sweeny v. Burns, 377 A.2d 338, 340 (Conn. C.P. 1977) 
(declaring that “[t]he statute [disenfranchising felons] is clearly penal in nature”); 
Crutchfield v. Collins, 607 S.W.2d 478 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980) (finding “it is clearly 
anticipated that the legislature shall provide in advance for the punishment of 
disenfranchisement”). 
 31 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
 32 Collateral Consequences, supra note 6, at 941-42. 
 33 Examples of civil disabilities included the prohibition of criminals from 
“appearing in court, voting, making speeches, attending assemblies, and serving in 
the army.”  Id. at 941. 
 34 Id. at 942. 
 35 Id. 
 36 For a more detailed description of outlawry, see Note, The Disenfranchisement of 
Ex-Felons: Citizenship, Criminality, and “The Purity of the Ballot Box”, 102 HARV. L. REV. 
1300, 1301-02 & 1317 n.6 (1989) [hereinafter Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons]. 
 37 Collateral Consequences, supra note 6, at 942.  A person convicted of a felony or 
treason was deemed “attainted,” which entailed the loss of civil and proprietary 
rights.  Id. at 942-43.  Attainder and civil death eventually came to be synonymous. Id. 
at 943. 
 38 Id. at 942. 
 39 Id. 
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offender.40  Those that managed to escape death were nevertheless 
declared “attainted” or “civilly dead”41 and stripped of all civil and 
proprietary rights.42  Additionally, the offender’s criminal act tainted 
his family through the doctrine of “corruption of blood.”43  These 
severe tactics served the dual objectives of punishment at that time—
retribution and deterrence.44 
Early American penal laws adopted the English imposition of 
civil disabilities for those convicted of crime.45  Drafters of these early 
provisions, however, did not indicate the intended purpose of 
penalties such as disenfranchisement.46  Disenfranchisement may 
have been employed not as punishment of the individual but for the 
protection and benefit of society.47  Yet perhaps a more plausible 
explanation is that civil disabilities, such as the denial of the franchise 
to criminals, were “the result of the unquestioning adoption of the 
English penal system by our colonial forefathers . . .” similarly 
employed to punish and deter criminal behavior.48  Whatever the 
 
 40 Id. 
 41 See Collateral Consequences, supra note 6, at 943-44.  A few states still retain “civil 
death” statutes.  See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-a (McKinney 2002); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 13-6-1 (2001).  The penalties imposed by these statutes are not as severe as 
their English predecessors, though it is unclear exactly what rights are affected by 
their imposition.  Collateral Consequences, supra note 6, at 950-51.  Typically, civil death 
statutes provide a blanket cessation of certain rights, such as the right to contract, file 
a civil suit, inherit property, and also often impose a forfeiture of all public offices 
and private trusts.  Id.  Earlier interpretations of these statutes deemed that even the 
marriage of the convict was dissolved upon the imposition of a life sentence.  See, e.g., 
In re Lindewall’s Will, 39 N.E.2d 907, 912 (N.Y. 1942) (overruled by N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS 
LAW § 79-a (McKinney 2002)). 
 42 Collateral Consequences, supra note 6, at 943. 
 43 The doctrine of “corruption of blood” was based on the notion that the 
offender’s family was vicariously corrupted by the criminal’s immoral act. 
Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons, supra note 36, at 1301-02.  This eliminated any 
possibility of inheriting from or through the offender.  Id. 
 44 Collateral Consequences, supra note 6, at 944-45. 
 45 For a more descriptive account of civil disabilities in the American colonies, 
see id. at 949-50. 
 46 Id. at 950. 
 47 Id.  It has been suggested that, to protect society, the disenfranchisement of ex-
felons is necessary to “preserve the purity of the ballot box.”  Washington v. State, 75 
Ala. 582, 585 (1884).  See infra Part III. for an examination of the states’ purported 
need to protect the ballot from ex-felons. 
 48 Collateral Consequences, supra note 6, at 950; see also Byers v. Sun Sav. Bank, 139 
P. 948, 949 (Okla. 1914) (stating that while the plain meaning of the statute would 
require imposition of “[civil death], . . . the principles of law which this verbiage 
literally imports had its origin in the fogs and fictions of feudal jurisprudence and 
doubtless has been brought forward into modern statutes without fully realizing 
either the effect of its literal significance or the extent of its infringement upon the 
spirit of our system of government”). 
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theory behind the purpose of these disabilities, their imposition had 
a decidedly punitive effect.49 
In time, society questioned the utility and humanity of such 
practices, resulting in constitutional and judicial prohibitions of 
many civil disabilities.50  The disenfranchisement of criminals, 
however, received no such treatment and was incorporated into 
eleven state constitutions between 1776 and 1821.51 
B.  Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement Today 
The United States imprisons an estimated two million people—
more than any other country in the world.52  Since 1980, the rate of 
incarceration has more than tripled,53 due in large part to the 
combined effect of three-strikes laws54 and the “war on drugs.”55 
 
 49 See generally S. RUBIN,  THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 24 (1963) (discussing 
the harsh and socially degrading punishments of colonial America). 
 50 See, e.g., U.S CONST. art. III, § 3 (prohibiting corruption of blood and forfeiture 
except in cases of treason and, even in such circumstances, limiting those disabilities 
to the lifetime of the traitor); U.S CONST. art. I, § 9 (prohibiting bills of attainder); 
Davis v. Laning, 19 S.W. 846, 846 (Tex. 1892) (stating “civil death” is not a 
consequence of criminal conviction); Frazer v. Fulcher, 17 Ohio 260, 260-61 (1848) 
(stating that Ohio did not adopt the English practice of civil death). 
 51 Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 450 & n.4 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 
389 U.S. 1048 (1968) (listing the following constitutional provisions, which either 
expressly prohibited, or authorized the legislature to prohibit, convicted felons from 
voting.  VA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1776); KY. CONST. art. VIII, § 8 (1799); OHIO CONST. 
art. IV, § 4 (1802); LA. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (1812); IND. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (1816); 
MISS. CONST. art. VI, § 5 (1817); CONN. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (1818); ILL. CONST. art. II, 
§ 30 (1818); ALA. CONST. art. VI, § 5 (1819); MO. CONST. art. III, § 14 (1820); N.Y. 
CONST. art. II, § 2 (1821)). 
 52 See Kate Randall, Voting Rights Denied to 3.9 Million Americans Due to Criminal 
Convictions, at http://www.wsws.org/articles/2000/nov2000/vote-n08.shtml (Nov. 8, 
2000 ) (on file with author).  As of 2001, federal and state prisons accounted for 
1,962,220 inmates.  Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice: Corrections 
Statistics (2001), at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/welcome.html (on file with 
author).  Local jails incarcerated an additional 631,240 inmates.  Id.  Factoring in the 
4.6 million persons on probation and parole, the number of persons under some 
form of supervision totals almost 7.2 million.  Id. 
 53 See Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice: Corrections Statistics 
(2001), at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/welcome.html (on file with author). 
 54 Recidivist laws are more commonly referred to as “three strikes laws.”  Robert 
Heglin, Note, A Flurry of Recidivist Legislation Means: “Three Strikes And You’re Out”, 20 J. 
LEGIS. 213, 214 (1994).  The principle underlying these laws is, once convicted of a 
third felony, the offender is imprisoned for life.  Id.  See also, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
11, § 4214(b) (2001) (imposing life imprisonment following third felony conviction).  
For a detailed discussion of the efficacy of three strikes laws, see David Schultz, No 
Sleep in Mudville Tonight: The Impact of “Three Strike” Laws on State and Federal 
Corrections, Policy, Resources, and Crime Control, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 557 
(2000). 
 55 The “war on drugs,” which began in the 1980’s to combat the escalating use of 
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Consequently, the United States disenfranchises more convicted 
felons than any other democratic nation.56  Moreover, the 
disenfranchisement of ex-offenders for relatively minor crimes has 
become an almost uniquely American phenomenon.57  Even 
England, the country from which America adopted this practice, 
automatically restores the right to vote to offenders once they have 
completed their sentence.58  As other nations have moved toward 
allowing even those under state supervision to participate in their 
electoral process,59 the retention of ex-felon disenfranchisement in 
America has drawn international criticism.60 
The state statutes and constitutional provisions that 
disenfranchise ex-felons vary in terminology and application, but the 
underlying premise is simple.  Once convicted of a “felony,”61 a 
 
drugs in the United States, resulted in a “tenfold” increase in the number of federal 
and states prisoners between 1980 and 1993.  Note, Winning the War on Drugs: A 
“Second Chance” for Nonviolent Drug Offenders, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1487 (2000). 
 56 See Losing the Vote: The Impact of Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States, 
ch. I., (1998), http://www.hrw.org/reports98/vote/usvot98o.htm (on file with 
author) [hereinafter Losing the Vote]. 
 57 See Mike Tidwell, Too Many Americans Can’t Vote, BALT. SUN, Oct. 29, 2000, at 
3C.  Israel, Sweden, Peru, Germany, and Zimbabwe are representative of countries 
that allow even those in prison the opportunity to vote.  See Jon Shure & Rashida 
MacMurray, Restoring the Right to Vote: Isn’t it Time? (Oct. 2000), at 
http://www.njpp.org/archives/vote.html.  By comparison, only two states, Maine 
and Vermont, currently extend the franchise to inmates.  ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-
A, § 112 (West 2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2122 (2001). 
 58 See Representation of the People Act, 1983, c. 2, § 3(1) (Eng.). 
 59 For example, the Constitutional Court of South Africa recently ruled that 
inmates are not to be denied the franchise as a condition of their incarceration.  
August v. Electoral Comm’n, 199 (4) BCLR 363 (SA). 
 60 See, e.g., Desmond Fernandes, Democracy in Action, INDEPENDENT (London), 
Nov. 13, 2000, at 2 (labeling Florida’s disenfranchisement laws “draconian”); Lord 
McCluskey, Festive Rush Gets Me Out of Mothballs, TIMES NEWSPAPER LIMITED (London), 
Dec. 17, 2000, at Features (using disenfranchisement to exemplify America’s faulty 
penal system); Tom Teepen, Clinton has the Right Views on Prison Reform, HAMILTON 
SPECTATOR (Toronto), Jan. 4, 2001, at A11 (equating  disenfranchisement with Jim 
Crow laws). 
 61 The qualifications for disenfranchisement in the nine states that permanently 
deny the franchise to ex-felons can be summarized as follows: Iowa, Mississippi, and 
Tennessee specifically enumerate the crimes that result in disenfranchisement.  IOWA 
CODE § 701.7 (2001); MISS. CONST. art. 12, § 241; TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-20-112 
(2001).  Alabama disenfranchises those convicted of a “felony involving moral 
turpitude.”  ALA. CONST. art. VIII.  Florida, Kentucky, Nevada, Virginia, and Wyoming 
disenfranchise persons convicted of a “felony,” and felonies are determined by the 
sentence imposed.  In each of these states, a sentence of death denotes a felony.  FLA. 
STAT. § 775.08 (2001); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.060 (Michie 2001); NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 193.120 (Michie 2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-8 (Michie 2001); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 6-10-101 (Michie 2001).  Additionally, Florida and Wyoming each classify a 
term of imprisonment for more than one year as a felony, FLA. STAT. § 775.08 (2001); 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-10-101 (Michie 2001), while in Kentucky, Nevada, and Virginia, 
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citizen is denied the right to vote unless his civil rights are restored by 
the jurisdiction that issued the conviction.62  Although the term 
felony is typically reserved for serious crimes that are punished by 
imprisonment or death,63 it has been expanded to include crimes 
that are neither notably serious64 nor necessarily result in actual 
imprisonment.65  As one court observed, “since conspiracy to commit 
a misdemeanor is itself a felony, disenfranchisement would 
automatically follow from conviction of conspiracy to operate a motor 
vehicle without a muffler . . . .”66  Furthermore, Florida, for example, 
shows no leniency to minors convicted of a felony, resulting in the 
denial of a right that may never have been exercised.67  Thus, “an 
eighteen-year-old first-time offender who trades a guilty plea for a 
lenient nonprison sentence (as almost all first-timers do, whether or 
not they are guilty) may unwittingly sacrifice forever his right to 
vote.”68 
C.  The Effect of Disenfranchisement Upon the Individual 
The detrimental effects that disenfranchisement impart on the 
ex-felon are readily apparent.  Rather than permitting the individual 
to reestablish himself as a viable participant in his community, 
disenfranchisement labels the ex-felon as a politically insignificant 
being.69  Psychologists have observed that “no more fiendish 
punishment could be devised” than to treat a person as if he were a 
 
any term of imprisonment in a state penitentiary constitutes a felony.  KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 431.060 (Michie 2001); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193.120 (Michie 2001); VA. 
CODE  ANN. § 18.2-8 (Michie 2001). 
 62 See infra PART I.E for a discussion of the voting restoration process. 
 63 Felony is defined as “[a] serious crime usu[ally] punishable by imprisonment 
for more than one year or by death.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 633 (7th ed. 1999). 
 64 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-20-112 (2001), for examples of less serious crimes 
that nevertheless result in disenfranchisement.  Such crimes include: “breaking into 
a business house, outhouse, . . . incest, . . . receiving stolen property . . . and 
destroying a will.”  Id. 
 65 Only two of every five felony convictions result in imprisonment.  See Nicholas 
Thompson, Locking up the Vote, The Washington Monthly Online (Jan./Feb. 2001), at 
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2001/0101.thompson.html; see also 
Losing the Vote, supra note 56, at ch. II (stating that while individuals often plead guilty 
to lesser felonies in order to avoid prison, these individuals may still be 
disenfranchised). 
 66 Otsuka v. Hite, 414 P.2d 412, 418 (Cal. 1966). 
 67 Fla. Op. Att’y Gen. 078-45 (March 10, 1978) (involving a minor convicted of a 
felony ineligible to vote). 
 68 Losing the Vote, supra note 56, at ch. II. 
 69 See McLaughlin v. City of Canton, 947 F. Supp. 954, 971 (S.D. Miss. 1995) 
(stating that those disenfranchised are “severed from the body politic and 
condemned to the lowest form of citizenship”). 
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nonexistent thing.70  Permanent disenfranchisement leads to a 
feeling of perpetual alienation, and implies to the individual that no 
matter how exemplary his life may become, he will never be fully 
accepted as a part of his community.71  Already faced with adversity in 
the areas of employment72 and education,73 the denial of the 
franchise serves as an additional reminder to the individual and the 
public of the ex-felon’s sub-citizen status.74 
Another disturbing aspect of disenfranchisement stems from its 
general assumption regarding an ex-felon’s measure of character.  
Commentators have recognized that “[a] fixation with what may be 
an isolated incident in a person’s past . . . fails to further the goal of 
measuring a person’s virtue in the present.”75  One needs only to look 
to prominent politicians who have admitted indiscretions to support 
the proposition that one can progress beyond the mistakes of his 
past.76 
Disenfranchisement has had the most severe impact on the 
African-American community.77  An estimated 1.4 million African-
American men, or thirteen percent of all black adult males, are 
currently or permanently excluded from voting by such laws.78  Most 
disturbing is the well-documented discriminatory intent that 
surrounded the adoption and expansion of disenfranchising 
 
 70 Collateral Consequences, supra note 6, at 1228 & n.366 (quoting W. JAMES, THE 
PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 293 (1890)). 
 71 See Chapman, supra note 13. 
 72 A survey conducted in 1963 revealed that, generally, the public was unwilling 
to employ ex-felons.  See Collateral Consequences, supra note 6, at 1229-30 & n.373 
(quoting JOINT COMMISION ON CORRECTIONAL MANPOWER AND TRAINING, THE PUBLIC 
LOOKS AT CRIME AND CORRECTIONS 15 (1968)). 
 73 See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r) (2002) (suspending federal financial aid eligibility 
for drug related convictions).  Additionally, many college applications require the 
disclosure of criminal arrests and convictions.  See, e.g., University of Illinois, 
Application for Admission to the Graduate College, available at 
http://www.cba.uiuc.edu/msba/application_forms/iparta.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 
2002) (on file with author). 
 74 See Collateral Consequences, supra note 6, at 1230. 
 75 Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons, supra note 36, at 1309. 
 76 Nancy J. Northup, Votes That Will Never Be Counted, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 12, 2000, at 
19.  Indeed, George W. Bush was arrested in Maine in 1976 for driving while 
intoxicated.  Mark Z. Barabak, Campaign 2000: Bush’s 1976 Arrest In Maine Is Revealed, 
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2000, § A1 at 28.  When asked about the drunk driving 
conviction, then presidential candidate Bush candidly responded, “I do not have a 
perfect record as a youth . . . .  When I was young, I did a lot of foolish things.”  J. 
Dionne Jr., Next-Door Politics, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2000, at A27. 
 77 See Harvey, supra note 15, at 1150-59, for a statistical analysis of the effect that 
disenfranchisement has on the African-American community. 
 78 Losing The Vote, supra note 56, at ch. I. 
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provisions following the Civil War.79  By tailoring these provisions to 
include what were perceived as “black crimes,”80 states were able to 
exclude blacks from the ballot without violating the newly adopted 
Fifteenth Amendment.81  Despite these discriminatory origins, 
challenges to disenfranchisement have not fared well.82 
D.  The Effect on the Community 
The negative impact that disenfranchisement imparts on the 
individual can also have adverse effects on the community.  Simply 
stated, if society chooses not to treat ex-felons as full-fledged, law-
abiding citizens, then the ex-felon may choose not to act like such a 
citizen.83  If ex-felons were allowed to participate in elections and 
thereby gain a sense of community, it seems less likely that they would 
commit acts detrimental to their community.84  As the Secretary of 
State of California observed, “the denial of the right to vote to [ex-
felons] is a hindrance to the efforts of society to rehabilitate former 
 
 79 “And what is it we want to do?  Why it is within the limits imposed by the 
Federal Constitution, to establish white supremacy in this state.”  Hunter v. 
Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229 (1985) (quoting 1 Official Proceedings of the 
Constitutional Convention of Alabama, May 21, 1901 to May 3, 1901, at 8 (1901) 
(statement of Delegate John B. Knox)).  For a more extensive sample of the racially 
discriminatory commentary surrounding the adoption of southern states’ 
constitutions, see Virginia E. Hench, The Death of Voting Rights: The Legal 
Disenfranchisement of Minority Voters, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 727 (1998). 
 80 Certain crimes, such as “thievery, adultery, arson, wife beating, housebreaking, 
and attempted rape” were perceived as more likely to be committed by blacks than 
whites, and were therefore included as crimes that disqualified one from voting.  
Andrew L. Shapiro, Challenging Criminal Disenfranchisement Under the Voting Rights Act: 
A New Strategy, 103 YALE L.J. 537, 541 (1993).  Robust crimes, such as robbery and 
murder, were thought of as likely committed by whites not blacks, and were 
therefore not included as grounds for disenfranchisement.  Id.  The framers of the 
Alabama constitution distinguished “white” crimes from “black” crimes based on a 
report prepared by a justice of the peace that presided over cases involving 
predominantly black defendants.  Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 232 (1985). 
 81 Andrew L. Shapiro, The Disenfranchised, AM. PROSPECT, Nov., 1997-Dec., 1997, at 
60, available at http://www.prospect.org/print/V8/35/shapiro-a.html. 
 82 See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (holding that 
disenfranchisement does not violate equal protection); Wesley v. Collins, 605 F. 
Supp. 802 (M.D. Tenn. 1985), aff’d, 791 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1986) 
(disenfranchisement does not violate the Voting Rights Act).  A successful challenge 
to felon disenfranchisement, based on discriminatory intent and effect, was 
announced in Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985).  For a discussion of the 
Court’s reasoning in Hunter, see infra note 136. 
 83 Thompson, supra note 65. 
 84 Civil Participation and Rehabilitation Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R 906 Before the 
House Comm. on the Judiciary (1999) (statement of Marc Mauer, Assistant Director, 
The Sentencing Project). 
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felons and convert them into law-abiding and productive citizens.”85  
The degradation of being labeled unfit to vote deteriorates the ex-
felon’s self esteem.86  Unsurprisingly, commentators cite low self-
esteem as a likely contributor to recidivist behavior.87 
The community is also be harmed by the disenfranchisement of 
a group with a unique perspective of the criminal justice system.  
Perhaps such an informed individual could use this knowledge to 
effect meaningful improvements in the system, which may someday 
be of consequence to other members of the community.  Without the 
ability to cast a vote, however, it is unlikely that an ex-felon would 
choose to become involved.88 
E.  Regaining the Vote 
In some states, only a gubernatorial pardon can restore one’s 
right to vote.89  Other states assign the restoration of civil rights to 
courts,90 a board of pardons,91 or the legislature.92  Thus, one’s right 
to vote is not technically lost forever.93  Restoration of the franchise is 
the exception, however, not the rule.94  As noted by The Sentencing 
Project, a human-rights advocate, most ex-felons do not have “the 
financial or political resources needed to succeed”95 in restoring the 
vote, and many incorrectly believe that their vote is  permanently 
lost.96  Moreover, those seeking to reclaim voting rights are often 
 
 85 Memorandum of the Secretary of the State of California in Opposition to 
Certiorari, Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 79 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(No. 73-324) [alteration added]. 
 86 Howard Itzkowitz & Lauren Oldak, Note, Restoring the Ex-Offender’s Right to Vote: 
Background and Developments, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 721, 732 (1973). 
 87 See, e.g., id. at 732 & n.87. 
 88 See Tidwell, supra note 57, at 3C (observing that without the ability to vote, ex-
felons are powerless to address the very laws that denied them the vote). 
 89 See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 48A.6 (2001); KY. CONST. § 145.  For federal felony 
convictions, a pardon from the President of the United States may be necessary to 
restore the vote.  See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 48A.6 (2001). 
 90 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-29-105 (2001). 
 91 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 17-3-10 (2001). 
 92 See, e.g., MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 253. 
 93 Supra notes 90-92.  But see TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-29-105(c)(2)(B) (2001) 
(making restoration of suffrage unavailable for persons convicted of “murder, rape, 
treason or voter fraud”). 
 94 See Losing the Vote, supra note 56. 
 95 Id.  To illustrate the improbability of regaining the vote, only 404 of a total of 
200,000 Virginia ex-felons were returned the franchise in 1996 and 1997.  Id; cf. 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-29-105(c)(6) (2001) (stating that all costs for restoration are 
borne by the applicant). 
 96 Losing the Vote, supra note 56, at ch. II. 
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misinformed about the restoration process.97  Finally, the differences 
in voting restrictions and restoration throughout the states make it 
necessary for the ex-felon to investigate a state’s position before 
choosing to relocate to that state.98  For example, a person convicted 
of burglary in New Jersey would regain the vote upon completion of 
his sentence,99 but would once again lose the vote if he relocated to 
Tennessee.100 
The requirements and questions asked of the applicant for 
restoration range from the curious — Alabama requires DNA 
samples101 — to the irrelevant—the cause of death of the ex-felon’s 
parents.102  Other questions are seemingly invidious—Florida requires 
the applicant to provide the names and a description of any 
organizations he is affiliated with, along with the nature of that 
affiliation.103  Such requirements and questions have little bearing on 
whether the applicant “has sustained the character of a person of 
honesty, respectability and veracity,”104 and is therefore worthy of 
reentering the political process.  Nevertheless, those denied 
restoration are given no explanation, and the decision is not subject 
to review.105 
 
 97 In Nevada, for example, a letter sent to ex-felons states there is a ten year 
waiting period before they can apply for restoration of the vote.  Allard & Mauer, 
supra note 12, at 4.  The waiting period, however, is only five years.  Id. 
 98 In some states, a conviction from another jurisdiction will be measured 
according to the laws of the state in which the ex-felon currently resides.  If the 
offense is classified as a felony in that state, it results in disenfranchisement.  See, e.g., 
Gutterman v. State, 141 So. 2d 21, 27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (holding that a 
conviction of second degree assault in New York did not constitute a disqualifying 
felony under the laws of Florida).  In other states, any felony conviction, regardless of 
whether the offense would constitute a felony in that state, results in 
disenfranchisement.  See, e.g., NEV. CONST. art. 2, § 1 (felony convictions from foreign 
jurisdictions result in disenfranchisement, even if not considered a felony in 
Nevada); Mills v. Campbell County Canvassing Bd., 707 P.2d 747, 750-51 (Wyo. 1985) 
(stating a felony conviction in Kansas results in disenfranchisement in Wyoming, 
regardless of whether the offense would be punishable as a felony in Wyoming). 
 99 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:4-1 (West 2001) (suffrage denied only during sentence). 
 100 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-20-112 (2001).  To regain the right to vote in Tennessee, 
the individual convicted of a felony in New Jersey would first need to secure a pardon 
from governor of New Jersey and then submit to the restoration process of 
Tennessee.  See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 2-19-143, 40-29-105 (2001). 
 101 See Allard & Mauer, supra note 12, at 4. 
 102 Thompson, supra note 65. 
 103 Id. 
 104 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-29-102 (2001). 
 105 See, e.g., Beacham v. Braterman, 300 F. Supp. 182, 184 (S.D. Fla. 1969) (stating 
that the restoration of civil rights is beyond judicial review); see also Elizabeth Du 
Fresne & William Du Fresne, The Case for Allowing “Convicted Mafiosi to Vote for Judges”: 
Beyond Green v. Board of Elections of New York City, 19 DEPAUL L. REV. 112, 134-35 (1969) 
(criticizing the “unfettered discretion” of the voting restoration process). 
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II.  CHALLENGES TO DISENFRANCHISEMENT 
As the Warren Court expanded the constitutional conception of 
the fundamental nature of the right to vote during the 1960’s,106 
challenges arose concerning the constitutionality of felon 
disenfranchisement.107  Prior to 1974, the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
guarantee of equal protection was viewed as the most logical and 
capable approach of eliminating (or at least restricting) the denial of 
the franchise to ex-felons.108  This view was based on the Supreme 
Court’s edict that any state action infringing upon an individual’s 
fundamental right to vote “must be carefully and meticulously 
scrutinized.”109 
In Stephens v. Yeomans,110 the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey employed this “enhanced” scrutiny and 
declared New Jersey’s disenfranchisement of ex-felons violative of 
equal protection.111  After reviewing the list of disenfranchising 
crimes and noting the inconsistencies therein,112 the court held that 
New Jersey’s purported purpose for denying the vote to ex-felons — 
protection of the “purity of the electoral process”113 — was not 
accomplished “by the totally irrational and inconsistent classification 
set forth” by the law.114  The court noted that the classification was 
not drawn with “the exacting standards of precision required by the 
equal protection clause” that accompany any infringement of the 
right to vote.115 
 
 106 Du Fresne & Du Fresne, supra note 105, at 117; see also, e.g., Harper  v. Va. State 
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 676 (1966) (“[t]he right to vote is . . . precious, . . . 
fundamental . . . .”); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (“The right to vote 
freely for the candidate of one’s choice is of the essence of a democratic society . . . 
.”). 
 107 See, e.g., Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 
U.S. 1048 (1968) (challenging disenfranchisement of ex-felons as violative of the 
Eighth and Fourteenth amendments, as well as a bill of attainder); Stephens v. 
Yeomans, 327 F. Supp. 1182 (D.N.J. 1970) (three-judge court) (challenging 
disenfranchisement under Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause); 
Otsuka v. Hite, 414 P.2d 412 (Cal. 1966) (same). 
 108 See Itzkowitz & Oldak, supra note 86, at 740. 
 109 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964). 
 110 327 F. Supp. 1182 (D.N.J. 1970) (three-judge court). 
 111 Id. at 1186. 
 112 Id. at 1188.  The court noted that convictions for fraud, embezzlement, 
extortion by a public official, bribery of a judge or legislator, attempted murder, 
kidnapping, loan sharking, and inciting insurrection would not result in 
disenfranchisement, while larceny, murder, and theft would result in 
disenfranchisement.  Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Stephens, 327 F. Supp. at 1188; see also Dillenburg v. Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222, 
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Two contemporary cases, Green v. Board of Elections116 and 
Kronlund v. Honstein,117 did not support the contention that enhanced 
scrutiny analysis was required for challenges to disenfranchisement 
laws.  Instead, these courts found that the disenfranchisement of 
individuals that may pose a threat to the electoral process was 
rationally related to the legitimate state purpose of protecting the 
purity of that process.118  Unlike Stephens, therefore, these decisions 
did not closely scrutinize the disenfranchisement laws to determine if 
they were narrowly drawn to achieve the purported state interest.119 
The debate over the proper level of scrutiny to apply to 
challenges of the states’ disenfranchisement laws was rendered 
inconsequential by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Richardson v. 
Ramirez.120  In Richardson, three ex-felons challenged the validity of 
California’s disenfranchisement law.121  The California Supreme 
Court had declared the law a violation of equal protection.122  In its 
decision, the California Court acknowledged the state’s interest in 
preventing election fraud,123 but found that the blanket 
disenfranchisement of all ex-offenders was not “necessary in the sense 
that it is the least burdensome means available to achieve that 
goal.”124  The court noted that election reform and technical 
advances in the electoral process had drastically reduced the 
possibility of fraudulent elections.125  Furthermore, the court 
determined that if such fraud should occur, California’s extensive 
penal laws concerning election crime provided an adequate and less 
 
1224 (9th Cir. 1972) (stating that the state interest served by disenfranchisement has 
never been adequately explained). 
 116 380 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1048 (1968). 
 117 327 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (three-judge court). 
 118 See Green, 380 F.2d at 451; Kronlund, 327 F. Supp. at 73. 
 119 See Green, 380 F.2d at 451-52 (stating it is not unreasonable for states to deny 
convicted mafiosi the right to vote); Kronlund, 327 F. Supp. at 73 (finding the state 
might have a legitimate concern that ex-offenders may be more likely to commit 
election crime). 
 120 418 U.S. 24 (1974). 
 121 Id. at 26-27. 
 122 Ramirez v. Brown, 507 P.2d 1345, 1357 (Cal. 1973), rev’d, Richardson v. 
Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974). 
 123 Id. at 1349. 
 124 Id. at 1353. 
 125 Id. at 1355. 
[I]t may have been feasible in 1850 to influence the outcome of an 
election by rounding up the impecunious and the thirsty, furnishing 
them with free liquor, premarked ballots, and transportation to the 
polls; to do so in 1973, if possible at all, would require the coordinated 
skills of a vast squadron of computer technicians. 
Id. 
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burdensome means of dealing with the occasional dishonest voter.126 
In reversing the California Supreme Court’s decision, the 
United States Supreme Court held that despite the recent expansion 
of equal protection under section one of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the area of voting rights,127 the “exclusion of felons from the vote 
has an affirmative sanction in [section] two128 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment . . . .”129  Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, 
conceded that the legislative history of section two, specifically the 
phrase “except for participation in rebellion or other crime,”130 shed 
little light on the reasons for including this section.131  Nevertheless, 
the majority’s examination of the limited history of section two led it 
to conclude that the language of that section “was intended by 
Congress to mean what it says.”132  The majority did acknowledge that 
 
 126 Id.  The court observed that there were seventy-six acts punishable as felonies, 
and another sixty misdemeanors, related to elections.  Ramirez, 507 P.2d at 1355. 
 127 See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 54 (collecting cases). 
 128 Section two of the Fourteenth Amendment provides in part the following: 
[W]hen the right to vote at any election . . . is denied to any of the 
male inhabitants of [a] State, being twenty-one years of age, and 
citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for 
participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation 
therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such 
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-
one years of age in such State. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
 129 Richardson, 418 U.S. at 54.  The respondents relied on recent Supreme Court 
decisions holding that state imposed infringements on the right to vote must be 
justified by a compelling state interest.  Id.  The Court refused to extend this 
enhanced scrutiny to the disenfranchisement of felons, reasoning that “section one 
[of the Fourteenth Amendment] . . . could not have been meant to bar outright a 
form of disenfranchisement which was expressly exempted from the less drastic 
sanction of reduced representation which section two imposed for other forms of 
disenfranchisement.”  Id. at 55. 
 130 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
 131 Richardson, 418 U.S. at 43. 
 132 Id.  The Court cited the readmission process of southern states following the 
Civil War to support the contention that Congress expressly intended section two to 
allow states to deny the vote to felons.  Id. at 48-52.  As a “fundamental condition” of 
readmission, each state was required to guarantee that suffrage would not be 
deprived to those otherwise entitled, “except as a punishment” for certain crimes.  Id. 
at 49-51.  Justice Marshall, in a dissenting opinion, disagreed with the majority’s 
assessment of the legislative history of section two.  Id. at 72-77 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting).  In Justice Marshall’s view, section two was included merely to ensure 
that Northern Republicans retained control of Congress following the readmission of 
southern states.  Id. at 73 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  That section, according to Justice 
Marshall, gave southern states the choice of allowing blacks to vote (with the 
expectation that they would sympathize with northern Republican ideals) or 
suffering reduced representation in Congress.  Richardson, 418 at 73-74 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting).  This political motivation, Justice Marshall explained, did not support 
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disenfranchisement of ex-offenders might be an outmoded practice, 
one in discord with the modern trend of rehabilitation and 
inclusiveness,133 but added that such a determination was the domain 
of a state’s legislature.134 
Richardson was damaging to future challenges of 
disenfranchisement in two respects.135  First, it virtually foreclosed a 
challenge of disenfranchisement under the most logical and able 
avenue of attack—equal protection.136  For example, the California 
Supreme Court’s decision in Ramirez plainly demonstrated the 
irrationality of restricting an ex-felon’s fundamental right to vote 
because he might commit election fraud.137  Furthermore, Ramirez 
 
the interpretation that section two expressly precludes the application of section 
one’s equal protection analysis to disenfranchisement for the commission of crime.  
Id. at 74-75 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 133 Id. at 55. 
 134 Id.  California apparently took heed of the Supreme Court’s implication.  In 
1974, shortly after the decision in Richardson, California amended its constitution to 
restore the vote to felons once they completed their sentence.  CAL. CONST. art. II, § 
4 (amended 1974).  In strikingly similar circumstances, the New York legislature 
repealed the state’s ex-felon disenfranchisement provision shortly after the Second 
Circuit upheld that law in Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1967), cert 
denied, 389 U.S. 1048 (1968); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 152 (McKinney 1973); see also 
Richardson, 418 U.S. at 83 n.28 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting New York’s 
subsequent repeal of its ex-felon disenfranchisement provision following the decision 
in Green). 
 135 For a general criticism of the Richardson Court’s refusal to extend equal 
protection analysis to disenfranchisement, see The Supreme Court, 1973 Term—
Disenfranchisement of Former Criminal Offenders, 88 HARV. L. REV. 101 (1974). 
 136 See, e.g., Allen v. Ellisor, 664 F.2d 391, 395 (4th Cir. 1981) (observing 
“Richardson is generally recognized as having closed the door on the equal 
protection” challenge to felon disenfranchisement).  In 1985, however, the Court did 
rule that Alabama’s disenfranchisement provision violated Fourteenth Amendment 
equal protection.  Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985).  In Hunter, the Court 
determined that the provision was adopted solely for discriminatory purposes and 
that it “continues to this day to have that effect.”  Id. at 233.  Thus, the Court 
distinguished Hunter from Richardson, declaring “that [section two] was not designed 
to permit the purposeful racial discrimination attending the enactment and 
operation of [Alabama’s disenfranchising provision] which otherwise violates 
[section one] of the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Id. (alteration added).  Subsequent 
challenges have been unable to establish a similar discriminatory motivation 
surrounding the initial adoption of their state’s disenfranchisement laws.  See, e.g., 
Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1263 (6th Cir. 1986) (finding no discriminatory 
intent surrounding the adoption of Tennessee’s disenfranchisement statute).  
Furthermore, even where such initial discriminatory intent has been established, 
challengers have been unable to demonstrate that it was carried forward into the 
modern counterparts of the original laws.  See, e.g., Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388, 
391 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding amendments to Mississippi’s constitution effectively 
removed the “discriminatory taint associated with the original version.”). 
 137 See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text; see also Richardson, 418 U.S. at 
79 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that disenfranchisement is not necessary to 
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found that even if such fraud did occasionally occur, a blanket 
restriction on ex-felon voting was wholly unnecessary where less 
intrusive means were available to effectively manage the situation.138  
Richardson’s declaration that section two of the Fourteenth 
Amendment cannot be “overridden” by section one, however, 
renders any such analysis of a state’s denial of the vote to ex-felons 
superfluous for equal protection purposes.139 
The second impediment created by Richardson is that it has 
inhibited challenges to disenfranchisement under other sections of 
the Constitution as well.  Although the Court mentioned in dicta that 
the “exclusion of convicted felons from the franchise violates no 
constitutional provision,” it did not rule that the disenfranchisement 
of felons is per se constitutional.140  The sole issue decided in 
Richardson was whether California’s practice of disenfranchising ex-
felons violated the Equal Protection Clause.141  The Court did not 
examine this provision under any other section of the Constitution.142  
Yet this dicta, when combined with the majority’s holding that section 
one of the Fourteenth Amendment is inapplicable to challenges of 
felon disenfranchisement in light of section two, has led courts to 
make the inaccurate assumption that the disenfranchisement of ex-
felons is immune from challenge under any Constitutional 
provision.143  The danger of such an assumption is that, on occasion, 
the Court has upheld a practice under one section of the 
Constitution and subsequently declared that same practice to be 
violative of another section.144 
Thus, the laws of the nine states that currently disenfranchise ex-
felons can be challenged under sections of the Constitution that the 
 
prevent voter fraud). 
 138 See supra note 126 and accompanying text; see also Richardson, 418 U.S. at 80 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (detailing the panoply of less intrusive means available to 
protect the electoral process from voter misconduct). 
 139 See Thiess v. State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 387 F. Supp. 1038, 1041 (D. 
Md. 1974) (noting that equal protection analysis was not required in light of 
Richardson). 
 140 Richardson, 418 U.S. at 53. 
 141 Richardson, 418 U.S. at 26-27. 
 142 Id. 
 143 See e.g., Farrakhan v. Locke, 987 F. Supp. 1304, 1314 (E.D. Wash. 1997) 
(refusing to consider challenges to disenfranchisement under the First, Fifth, and 
Eighth Amendments in light of Richardson). 
 144 Compare McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971) (holding that 
standardless jury discretion in death penalty cases did not violate the Due Process 
Clause), with Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (holding that standardless jury 
discretion in death penalty cases was a violation of the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause). 
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Supreme Court has not yet considered.  The Eighth Amendment’s 
protection against cruel and unusual punishments145 presents a 
plausible ground for such a challenge. 
III.  PUNISHMENT OR REGULATION? 
To be violative of the Eighth Amendment, disenfranchisement 
must be classified as punishment rather than a regulatory 
provision.146  In Trop v. Dulles,147 the Supreme Court addressed 
whether the denaturalization of a citizen for wartime desertion was 
violative of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and 
unusual punishments.148  Before reaching the issue of whether 
denaturalization was cruel and unusual, the Court first had to 
determine if this “disability” following a conviction for desertion was 
in fact a form of punishment.149  The government argued that the law 
in question was “technically . . . not a penal law”150 but simply a 
regulatory provision enacted by Congress under its war powers.151 
Rejecting the government’s invitation to defer to the 
Congressional classification of the law,152 the Court explained that, 
generally, the evident purpose behind a law that imposes a disability 
will dictate whether it is penal or regulatory.153  If the purpose of the 
disability is to “reprimand the wrongdoer, to deter others, etc.,” the 
law is punitive.154  On the other hand, a law enacted to “accomplish 
some other legitimate governmental purpose” is considered a non-
penal regulation, despite the disability to the individual that 
accompanies its imposition.155  To illustrate, the Court employed a 
 
 145 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 146 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 147 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
 148 Id. at 87. 
 149 Id. at 94; cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 (1977) (disciplinary 
paddling of students not considered punishment for Eighth Amendment purposes). 
 150 Trop, 356 U.S. at 94. 
 151 Id. at 97. 
 152 Id. at 94.  The Court admitted that its task would be far easier if the label 
attached to a law by Congress, and not the content of the law, was the sole 
consideration in determining the law’s validity.  Id.  The Court noted that 
Congressional classification of a law as penal or regulatory was one relevant factor in 
determining the purpose of the law.  Id.  The Court added, however, that it is 
“[d]oubtless even a clear legislative classification of a statute as ‘non-penal’ would 
alter the fundamental nature of a plainly penal statute.”  Id. at 95. 
 153 Trop, 356 U.S. at 96. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. (emphasis added).  The Court incorporated the test for distinguishing 
between penal and non-penal laws from cases dealing with ex-post facto laws and bills 
of attainder, which also addressed this threshold question. Id. 
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hypothetical person convicted of bank robbery.156  That person, the 
Court stated, “loses his right to liberty and often his right to vote.”157  
Unlike the deprivation of liberty, the Court continued, where the 
purpose is clearly penal, the loss of the bank robber’s right to vote 
would be “a nonpenal exercise of the power to regulate the 
franchise.”158 
Courts have relied on the above hypothetical from Trop as 
precedent for the proposition that disenfranchisement is not 
punishment.159  Such reliance on Trop is flawed in two respects.  First, 
the constitutionality of ex-felon disenfranchisement was not before 
the Court in Trop.160  The loss of the vote was merely used to 
juxtapose a disability that is clearly penal, and this “example” is no 
more than illustrative dictum.161  Second, by jumping ahead in the 
opinion and selecting the above quotation as the basis for their 
decisions, courts have missed the implicit equal protection concept of 
Trop, specifically, that a law imposing disabilities on a select group is a 
non-penal regulation only if shown “to accomplish some other 
legitimate governmental purpose.”162  In Kronlund, for example, the 
court summarily dismissed the plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment 
challenge, neither explaining the non-penal state interest served by 
disenfranchising ex-felons nor illustrating how such an interest might 
be accomplished by disenfranchisement.163  The court merely cited to 
Trop for the proposition that the Supreme Court has held 
 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Trop, 356 U.S. at 96-97.  Implicit in this example is that, if the purpose of 
disenfranchisement was to punish the offender, the law would constitute a cruel and 
unusual punishment.  See Du Fresne & Du Fresne, supra note 105, at 121. 
 159 See, e.g., Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1967) cert. denied, 389 
U.S. 1048 (1968) (declaring that disenfranchisement is not punishment for Eighth 
Amendment purposes based on Trop); Farrakhan v. Locke, 987 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D. 
Wash. 1997) (same); Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (three-
judge court) (same). 
 160 Trop, 356 U.S. at 87 (Court only presented with the constitutionality of 
denaturalization). 
 161 See, e.g., Otsuka v. Hite, 414 P.2d 412, 419 (recognizing Trop’s statements 
concerning felon disenfranchisement as “mere illustrative dicta.”).  As Justice 
Marshall reminded in Richardson v. Ramirez, “dictum is not precedent . . . .”  418 U.S. 
24, 84 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 162 Trop, 356 U.S. at 96 (emphasis added). 
 163 327 F. Supp. at 74.  Perhaps this “oversight” in Kronlund occurred because the 
Court in Trop had little trouble determining that the only evident purpose served by 
denaturalization was to punish the offender.  See Trop, 356 U.S. at 96-97.  Because the 
Court could find no legitimate, non-penal purpose served by denaturalization, it was 
thus unnecessary to decide if the law in fact accomplished that purpose.  Id. at 97. 
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disenfranchisement to be a non-penal regulation of the franchise.164 
Thus, while courts have contended that disenfranchisement is 
not punishment, their opinions lack proper analysis to support this 
conclusion.165  This necessitates an examination of 
disenfranchisement to determine first, if there is a legitimate, non-
penal state interest underlying the law, and second, whether that 
interest is accomplished by the blanket exclusion of all ex-felons from 
participation in the franchise.166  If a legitimate, non-penal purpose 
can be found, and the punitive impact of the law is “an inevitable 
consequence of the regulatory provision . . .” then 
disenfranchisement is properly classified as regulatory, despite its 
punitive impact.167  If, however, a non-penal purpose for the law 
cannot be found, or, if “the punitive impact comes from aspects of 
the law unnecessary to accomplish its regulatory purpose,”168 then 
disenfranchisement is a penal measure and subject to the 
requirements of the Eighth Amendment.169 
The legislative intent of the provisions in the nine states that 
permanently disenfranchise ex-felons is not apparent on the face of 
these laws.170  While none of these provisions expressly indicate that 
disenfranchisement serves a punitive purpose,171 they also fail to 
 
 164 Kronlund, 327 F. Supp. at 74. 
 165 See, e.g., Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 
U.S. 1048 (1968) (failing to discuss the non-penal state interest accomplished by ex-
felon disenfranchisement); Farrakhan v. Locke, 987 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D. Wash. 1997) 
(same); Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (three-judge court) 
(same). 
 166 See Trop, 356 U.S. at 96; see also infra notes 166-68 and accompanying text. 
 167 Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 46, 662 A.2d 367, 390 (1995). 
 168 Id. 
 169 This analysis is not inconsistent with Richardson, which simply held that, in light 
of section two’s express language, no analysis of a state’s disenfranchisement 
provision need be undertaken for equal protection purposes.  Richardson v. 
Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974). 
 170 See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 48A.6 (2001) (only prescribing voter qualifications); 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-11 (2001) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-20-112 (2001) 
(same).  But compare the state constitution of New Mexico, a state that does not 
preclude ex-felon voting, which provides, “[t]he legislature shall enact such laws as 
will secure the secrecy of the ballot, the purity of elections and guard against the 
abuse of elective franchise.”  N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1.  Bound by this constitutional 
mandate, the New Mexico legislature restored the right to vote to ex-felons in 2001, 
apparently confident that ex-felons did not pose a threat to the secrecy and purity of 
elections.  N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-4-27.1 (Michie 2001). 
 171 See supra note 170.  Curiously, the disenfranchising statute of Wyoming is 
located among that state’s penal laws, indicating a punitive intent on the part of the 
legislature.  WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-10-106 (Michie 2001); cf. DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2 
(disenfranchisement of felons imposed as punishment); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:4-1 
(West 2001) (same). 
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indicate the non-penal purpose they seek to achieve.172  Moreover, 
legislative findings surrounding the original adoption of these 
provisions are virtually nonexistent.173  The history of 
disenfranchisement shows that it was a decidedly punitive measure in 
the civilizations from which America inherited the practice.174  Courts 
have nevertheless disregarded this historically punitive understanding 
of disenfranchisement and instead “prescribe[d] tenable regulatory 
grounds” to justify the states’ right to deny the vote to ex-felons.175  It 
is necessary, therefore, to examine both the legitimacy of these 
tenable regulatory grounds and whether disenfranchisement is 
necessary for their accomplishment. 
A.  The Purity of the Ballot Box 
The primary justification espoused for allowing states to deny 
the vote to ex-felons is the need to protect the “purity of the ballot 
box.”176  This phrase first appeared in 1884 in Washington v. State.177 
The court there stated: 
It is quite common also to deny the right of suffrage . . . to such 
[persons] as have been convicted of infamous crimes.  The 
manifest purpose is to preserve the purity of the ballot box, which 
is the only sure foundation of republican liberty, and which needs 
protection against the invasion of corruption, just as much as 
against ignorance, incapacity, or tyranny . . . .  The presumption 
is, that one rendered infamous by conviction of felony, or other 
base offense indicative of great moral turpitude, is unfit to 
exercise the privilege of suffrage . . . upon terms of equality with 
freemen who are clothed by the state with the toga of political 
citizenship.  It is proper, therefore, that this class should be 
 
 172 See supra note 170. 
 173 Collateral Consequences, supra note 6, at 1191-92.  Evidence of a punitive purpose 
for disenfranchisement, however, is found in the “fundamental condition” that was 
imposed on states seeking readmission to representation in Congress following the 
Civil War.  Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 51-52 (1974).  In searching for an 
historical understanding of disenfranchisement, the Court in Richardson noted that 
readmission to the Union was contingent upon guarantying the vote to otherwise 
eligible citizens, with the exception that the vote could be denied “as punishment for 
such crimes as are now felonies . . . .”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 174 Supra PART I. A. 
 175 Collateral Consequences, supra note 6, at 1191-92.  In light of this history, 
however, it seems more plausible that disenfranchisement was simply brought 
forward into early American jurisprudence with the same punitive intent attributed 
to its English counterpart.  Id. at 1192. 
 176 See, e.g., Stephens v. Yeomans, 327 F. Supp. 1182, 1188 (D.N.J. 1970) (three-
judge court); Otsuka v. Hite, 414 P.2d 412, 417 (Cal. 1966); Washington v. State, 75 
Ala. 582, 585 (Ala. 1884). 
 177 75 Ala. 582 (Ala. 1884). 
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denied a right, the exercise of which might sometimes hazard the 
welfare of communities, if not that of the State itself, at least in 
close political contests.178 
Two rationales have emerged from this language to support the state 
interest in denying the vote to ex-offenders in order to protect the 
ballot. 
First, proponents of ex-felon disenfranchisement have claimed 
that it is necessary to prevent voter fraud, which, if present, could 
have detrimental effects on the outcome of elections.179  Second is 
the contention that the state has a legitimate interest in denying the 
vote to citizens whose “proven anti-social behavior . . .”180 “might be 
subversive of the interests of an orderly society.”181  This rationale 
posits that, given the opportunity to vote, ex-felons would do so 
irresponsibly182 or elect candidates that would decriminalize their 
activities.183  Although these non-penal rationales for preserving the 
purity of the electoral process appear legitimate at first glance, any 
such legitimacy comes undone when closely examined. 
1.  Voter Fraud 
The first justification for disenfranchisement posits that the ex-
felon, having shown his propensity for immorality, is likely to engage 
in voter fraud if given the opportunity to vote by either selling his 
vote or otherwise frustrating the outcome of elections.184  The 
contention that states have an interest in preventing voter fraud 
seems legitimate until one considers that, due to advances in the way 
citizens vote, “election fraud may no longer be a serious danger.”185  
As noted in Ramirez, a case decided in 1973, the prevalence of 
fraudulent voting practices in earlier times may have necessitated the 
disenfranchisement of persons with questionable morality in order to 
ensure an accurate measure of the will of the people.186  Ramirez 
added, however, that election reform and technological advances in 
the elective process have “radically diminished the possibility of 
 
 178 Id. at 585. 
 179 Itzkowitz & Oldak, supra note 86, at 737-38. 
 180 Kronlund, 327 F. Supp. at 73. 
 181 Richardson, 418 U.S. at 81 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 182 The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons, supra note 36, at 1307-08. 
 183 See, e.g., Green, 380 F.2d at 451-52 (stating it is not unreasonable to forbid 
“convicted mafiosi” from voting for judges and district attorneys). 
 184 Itzkowitz & Oldak, supra note 86, at 737-38. 
 185 Richardson, 418 U.S. at 81 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 186 Ramirez v. Brown, 507 P.2d 1345, 1353-55 (Cal. 1973). 
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election fraud”187 to the point where “deliberate irregularities, if 
present today, are rare and have negligible effects on election 
results.”188  There is no reason to believe that the prevalence of voter 
fraud has not further diminished in the thirty years since Ramirez. 
A further indication that disenfranchisement is not enacted to 
curb fraudulent voting practices is the underinclusive nature of the 
disenfranchising laws.189  If prevention of voter fraud were truly the 
purpose of disenfranchisement, then one would expect that the 
commission of any crime involving the electoral process would result 
in the loss of the vote.  Surely one who violently intimidates voters or 
causes a candidate to withdraw from an election poses a grave danger 
to the integrity of the electoral process.  Yet in many states, these and 
other election related offenses do not result in a denial of the 
franchise.190  Such underinclusiveness undermines the contention 
that disenfranchisement is intended as a regulatory measure 
designed to protect the purity of a state’s electoral process. 
Whereas the omission of certain election related offenses from 
the states’ disenfranchising provisions renders those laws 
underinclusive, the inclusion of disqualifying crimes that have no 
correlation to election crime or voter fraud renders the laws 
overinclusive.191  If revocation of the vote were limited to crimes 
associated with the electoral process, the contention that 
disenfranchisement is designed to prevent voter fraud would appear 
more plausible.192  Crimes such as bigamy, destruction of a will, and 
breaking into an outhouse,193 however, simply have no correlation 
with the electoral process, and do not logically indicate a greater 
propensity on the part of the ex-offender to commit election crime.194  
 
 187 Id. at 1355. 
 188 Id.  The court based this conclusion on a report from the Los Angeles County 
Registrar of Voters, which stated there had been no reported incidents of deliberate 
voting misconduct in the previous 41 years.  Id. 
 189 Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons, supra note 36, at 1303. 
 190 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 293.710 (2001) (classifying intimidation of voters as 
a gross misdemeanor); NEV. REV. STAT. § 293.750 (2001) (classifying destruction of 
election equipment as a gross misdemeanor); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-26-112 (Michie 
2001) (classifying “causing or attempting to cause” a candidate’s withdrawal from an 
election as a misdemeanor). 
 191 Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 79 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 192 See Tidwell, supra note 57.  But see Itzkowitz & Oldak, supra note 86, at 738 
(stating conviction for election crime does not necessarily predetermine that similar 
crimes will be committed by the individual upon release from state supervision). 
 193 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-20-112 (2001) (listing bigamy, destruction of a 
will, and breaking into an outhouse as crimes that result in disenfranchisement). 
 194 Itzkowitz & Oldak, supra note 86, at 738.  Moreover, even if such a correlation 
could be shown, the preemptive denial of the vote to curb potential fraud does not 
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There has been no substantiation that “ex-felons generally are any 
more likely to abuse the ballot than the remainder of the 
population.”195  Therefore, even accepting the state’s interest in 
preventing the fraudulent outcome of elections as legitimate, the 
blanket exclusion of ex-felons from the ballot regardless of the nature 
of their crime is not necessary to accomplish that end. 
To further emphasize the overinclusive nature of the 
disenfranchisement of ex-felons, it is helpful to examine a provision 
found to be both legitimate and narrowly tailored to accomplish its 
intended purpose.  In many states, convicted sex-offenders are 
required to register with local officials upon their reentry into the 
community.196  Courts have agreed with the legislative determination 
that the state has a legitimate interest in protecting the community 
from the threat of sex crimes, especially crimes directed at minors.197  
The registration requirement is imposed not to punish the individual 
by invading his right to privacy, but as a means to safeguard the 
community from the threat of recidivism posed by the proven sex-
offender.198  The restriction of the individual’s fundamental right to 
privacy is merely “an inevitable consequence of the regulatory 
provision . . . .”199  As such, courts have labeled the registration of sex-
offenders as a legitimate, non-penal regulatory measure.200 
Applying the above observation to the denial of the vote, it 
 
comport with the notion underlying American jurisprudence—that a person is 
innocent until proven guilty.  Id. at 739.  It has been noted that “[o]ur criminal 
justice system is based on the premise that once a criminal has completed his 
sentence, society has the burden of proving guilt of a new crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt and does not have the right to punish the ex-criminal in advance on the basis 
of probability.”  Id. 
 195 Richardson, 418 U.S. at 80 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 196 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (Deering 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C: 7-1 to –
11 (West 2001).  These laws are more commonly referred to as Megan’s law, in 
remembrance of Megan Kanka, a seven year old who was raped and murdered by a 
twice-convicted sex-offender.  Steve Marshall, Megan’s Law Upheld // N.J. Sex-Offender 
Notifications Can Resume, USA TODAY, July 26, 1995, at 2A. 
 197 See, e.g., State v. Burr, 598 N.W.2d 147, 158-59 (N.D. 1999), aff’d 234 F.3d 1052 
(8th Cir. 2000) (stating sex registration is designed to assist in the legitimate purpose 
of protecting the public); see also Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 73, 662 A.2d 367, 404 
(1995) (upholding Megan’s law, because, inter alia, the state has a legitimate interest 
in preventing sex offenses).  But cf., Koresh A. Avrahmian, Note, A Critical Perspective: 
Do “Megan’s Laws” Really Shield Children From Sex-Predators?, 19 J. JUV. L. 301 (1998) 
(discussing the ineffectiveness and continuing constitutional uncertainty of sex-
offender laws). 
 198 Doe, 142 N.J. at 73, 662 A.2d at 404; McDonald v. Marin County Sheriff, No. 98-
16144, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 10923, at *2 (9th Cir. May 25, 1999). 
 199 Doe, 142 N.J. at 75, 662 A.2d at 405. 
 200 See, e.g., id.; McDonald, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 10923, at *2 (9th Cir. May 25, 
1999). 
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becomes clear that the disenfranchisement of all ex-felons, 
irrespective of their crime, is grossly overinclusive.201  Whereas the 
registration of sex-offenders is limited to persons who have 
demonstrated a propensity for committing the very crime the state 
seeks to prevent,202 disenfranchisement draws no such distinction.203  
Rather, the ex-felon is deemed likely to commit voter fraud, even 
when convicted of an offense that is wholly unrelated to the electoral 
process.204 
But why stop at denying these “dangerous” individuals the right 
to vote?  If one were to accept the rationale that all felons are likely to 
engage in election fraud if returned the vote, it would seem 
reasonable for the state to require all ex-felons to register as sex-
offenders, regardless of their previous offense.  The state interest in 
protecting the community from future sex offenses is certainly as 
compelling as protecting the integrity of elections from fraud.  Since 
the ex-felon’s past infraction is deemed indicative of his future 
propensity for crime, all ex-felons could be thought to pose a danger 
to their respective communities and thus, be required to register as 
sex-offenders. 
This illustration demonstrates the irrationality of a provision that 
would require an individual convicted of burglary, for example, to 
register as a sex-offender.  There is simply no connection between the 
two offenses that would justify such an intrusion of the ex-felon’s 
right to privacy.  In a sense, this same irrationality is manifest when 
the state denies the vote to ex-felons for the purpose of preventing 
fraudulent voting.  The state effectively labels the ex-felon potentially 
dangerous to the electoral process, despite any nexus between his 
past offense and the evil the state seeks to prevent.  Just as there is no 
reason to believe that a burglar is likely to commit sex offenses upon 
his release from state supervision, there is similarly no reason to 
believe that this individual would commit election crime.  Therefore, 
for the same reason the state cannot indiscriminately classify all ex-
felons as potential sex-offenders,205 it should not be permitted to 
classify all ex-felons a potential threat to the electoral process. 
Another reason that disenfranchisement is not necessary to 
protect against voter fraud is the sheer number of laws that the states 
 
 201 Richardson, 418 U.S. at 79 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 202 Doe, 142 N.J. at 74, 662 A.2d at 404. 
 203 See supra text accompanying notes 191-95. 
 204 Id. 
 205 Doe, 142 N.J. at 74, 662 A.2d at 404 (noting that Megan’s law is only applicable 
to those “found to be repetitive and compulsive [sex-]offenders”). 
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have at their disposal to combat voter misconduct.206  In Dunn v. 
Blumstein,207 a decision invalidating Tennessee’s durational residency 
requirement for voting, the Court rejected the state’s argument that a 
one year residency requirement for all voters was necessary to prevent 
election fraud.208  The Court stated that Tennessee’s election code, 
and not the “broadly imposed political disabilit[y]” of residency 
requirements, was better suited to detect and deter instances of voter 
fraud.209  It seems clear that the same mechanisms that prevent 
fraudulent voting by citizens failing to meet a state’s durational 
requirements would also adequately prevent fraudulent voting 
committed by ex-felons.  If these mechanisms are inadequate, then 
additional laws should be passed to curtail voter fraud210 rather than 
denying the vote to otherwise eligible citizens.  Because the states 
have adequate means to deal with voter misconduct, the 
disenfranchisement of ex-felons is thus unnecessary in the quest to 
protect the purity of the ballot. 
Finally, it is important to note that possession of the right to vote 
is not required to commit the majority of election offenses.  Crimes 
such as intimidating voters,211 disrupting a polling place,212 or 
tampering with election equipment,213 for example, can be 
committed by any citizen, regardless of his eligibility to vote.  The 
only crime that that is dependent upon possession of the vote for its 
commission is the sale of that vote.214  Yet it cannot be seriously 
contended that the possibility of the ex-felon selling his one vote 
necessitates the blanket exclusion of all ex-felons from the franchise 
in order to ensure the validity of elections.215  Such a contention takes 
the “one bad apple” adage to illogical and unjust extremes.216 
 
 206 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 104.011-.42 (2001) (listing 37 separate election 
offenses); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-26-101 to –121 (Michie 2001) (listing 21 separate 
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 207 405 U.S. 330 (1971). 
 208 Id. at 345-46.  The Court acknowledged that durational residency requirements 
may have been necessary in earlier times to prevent fraudulent voting by non-
residents. Id. at 346.  Given the modern system of registration employed by 
Tennessee, however, the Court observed that such durational requirements “add[] 
nothing to . . . the effort to stop fraud.”  Id. 
 209 Id. at 353. 
 210 Du Fresne & Du Fresne, supra note 105, at 123. 
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 212 See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-26-114 (Michie 2001). 
 213 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 293.755 (2001). 
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As the above discussion illustrates, the state interest in 
preventing voter fraud is tenuous, considering the remote possibility 
of such fraud occurring, much less affecting the outcome of an 
election.  Moreover, even if the prevention of voter fraud is accepted 
as a legitimate interest of the state, the blanket disenfranchisement of 
ex-felons is neither necessary nor able to accomplish that interest.  
The prevention of voter fraud, therefore, cannot suffice as a non-
penal justification for denying the vote to ex-felons. 
2.  The Anti-Social Voter 
The anti-social voter justification for denying the vote to ex-
felons can be divided into two separate but similar contentions.  The 
first is that the ex-felon’s propensity for immorality has “raised 
questions about [his] ability to vote responsibly.”217  The second is 
that ex-felons must be deprived of the vote “for fear they might vote 
to repeal or emasculate provisions of the criminal code.”218 
The first contention rests on the assumption that the ex-felon 
has demonstrated a lack of the virtue necessary to responsibly 
participate in the determination of those that will govern.219  The fear 
here is not that the ex-felon will disrupt the electoral process through 
fraud or other criminal activity, but that his very participation in that 
process “is somehow impure in and of itself.”220 
The disenfranchisement of ex-felons based on their inability to 
vote responsibly “fits easily within th[e] exclusionary tradition” that 
once kept “blacks, women, and the poor from the political 
process.”221  Although the merit of such “tradition” has since been 
extinguished with respect to the aforementioned classes of 
individuals,222 it has survived as a tenable justification for excluding 
ex-felons from the political process.223  Despite this generalized 
conception that ex-felons lack the moral capability to vote 
responsibly, it has never been demonstrated “why [felons] cannot 
make political decisions just as well or badly as the rest of [society] 
can.”224  Proof of the ex-felon’s inability to vote responsibly is unlikely 
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 219 The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons, supra note 36, at 1307-08. 
 220 Du Fresne & Du Fresne, supra note 105, at 123. 
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 223 See, e.g., Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (stating the 
ex-felon’s proven anti-social behavior threatens society’s aims). 
 224 Daniel R. Ortiz, Pursuing a Perfect Politics: The Allure and Failure of Process Theory, 
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to surface, as the term “responsible voting” evades definition.  Thus, 
the exclusion of the ex-felon from the electoral process to prevent 
“irresponsible” voting cannot be deemed a legitimate, non-penal 
regulation of the franchise. 
While the aforementioned justification for disenfranchisement 
can be summarized as a fear of “how” the ex-felon will vote, the 
following justification can aptly be summarized as a fear of “what” or 
“for whom” the ex-felon will elect.  Green v. Board of Elections225 
announced that a state has a legitimate interest in preventing ex-
felons from participating in the election of members of the criminal 
justice system.226  Implicit in this statement is the fear that the ex-
felon might support a dishonest candidate, who, in turn, would 
decriminalize his activities, or at least empathize with the perpetrator 
of such crimes.227 
Before discussing the constitutional infirmities that accompany 
this attempt to legitimize ex-felon disenfranchisement, two common-
sense observations are in order.  First, there are many ways in which 
the ex-felon — or anyone else for that matter — could support a 
dishonest candidate without actually casting a ballot.228  As previously 
mentioned, the ability to influence or frustrate the outcome of 
elections is not contingent on possessing the right to vote.229  Second, 
a politician running on a platform of “crime is good” would engender 
little support from the majority of voters, including criminals, who 
realize the utility and necessity of the criminal code.230  As a practical 
matter, therefore, the “imaginary horrible” of “the criminal element 
 
77 VA. L. REV. 721, 731 (1991). 
 225 380 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1048 (1968). 
 226 Id. at 451.  Green was decided before the Supreme Court’s ruling in Richardson 
v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974), which held that section two of the Equal Protection 
Clause affirmatively sanctioned disenfranchisement for those convicted of crime.  It 
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challenge.  Id. at 451-52.  The court noted that due to the likelihood of recidivism 
and the threat of organized crime: 
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Id. at 451. 
 227 Richardson, 418 U.S. at 81 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 228 See Itzkowitz & Oldak, supra note 86, at 738. 
 229 Supra text accompanying notes 211-16. 
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controlling a town through the ballot”231 cannot suffice as the non-
penal reason for denying the vote to ex-felons. 
In addition to lacking in common sense, a justification for 
denying the franchise to an otherwise eligible citizen based on a fear 
of how or for whom that person might vote is also constitutionally 
infirm.232  Numerous decisions have denounced the denial of the vote 
to otherwise eligible citizens who hold political views contrary to the 
status quo.233  Carrington v. Rash234 held that the right to vote can not 
“be obliterated because of a fear of the political views of a particular 
group . . . .”235  Such reasoning flows from the notion that our 
republican system of government is founded on majority rule.236  The 
benefits and consequences of such a system are that “the will of the 
greater number of citizens . . . determines which candidate shall be 
elected.”237  When the majority of citizens votes for a particular 
candidate, “the democratic process must prevail,”238 regardless of the 
particular views of the majority or the candidate they have chosen.239 
Those that feel compelled to attempt to change the current state 
of the law should be allowed to do so.240  If the majority does not 
 
 231 Du Fresne & Du Fresne, supra note 105, at 123. 
 232 See Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965) (stating that the right to vote 
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(holding that fencing voters out from the franchise for fear of how they might vote is 
impermissible). 
 234 380 U.S. 89 (1965).  In Carrington, Texas argued that all military personnel 
stationed within that state, whether intending to reside in Texas or elsewhere, should 
be denied the vote in order to avoid a takeover of local politics by a concentrated 
military voting bloc.  Id. at 93.  The Court conceded that Texas had a legitimate 
interest in limiting the franchise to bona-fide residents.  Id. at 93-94.  The Court 
added, however, that the denial of the vote to persons that qualify as bona-fide 
residents, when done for a “fear of the political views” held by those residents, was 
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 235 Id. at 94. 
 236 Itzkowitz & Oldak, supra note 86, at 738. 
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 240 As Justice Marshall noted: 
Although, in the last century, this Court may have justified the 
exclusion of voters from the electoral process for fear that they would 
vote to change laws considered important by a temporal majority, I 
have little doubt that we would not countenance such a purpose today.  
The process of democracy is one of change.  Our laws are not frozen 
into immutable form, they are constantly in the process of revision in 
response to the needs of a changing society.  The public interest, as 
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agree that a law warrants revisal, it will remain unchanged.  Thus, any 
law designed to silence a particular group or political viewpoint is 
unnecessary, and “strikes at the very heart of the democratic 
process.”241  From this it follows that when a state denies the vote to 
ex-felons, it cannot do so for fear of how or for whom the ex-felon 
will vote. 
The above examination of the “legitimate” state interests in 
denying the vote to ex-felons reveals the flaws in such contentions.  
Due to further advances in the electoral process, fraudulent voting no 
longer presents a serious threat in modern day America.242  Yet even 
if such fraud were rampant, the denial of the vote to ex-felons is 
neither necessary nor able to alleviate this evil.243  Additionally, 
excluding citizens from the franchise for fear of how or for whom 
they might vote is not only constitutionally infirm and inconsistent 
with principles of majority rule,244 but devoid of common sense.  
While the punitive impact of denying a citizen the fundamental right 
to vote is readily apparent, a non-penal interest that is served by these 
provisions has not been demonstrated.  Therefore, the only state 
interest demonstrably served by disenfranchisement is the infliction 
of additional punishment for the commission of crime.  As such, it is 
subject to the requirements of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
of cruel and unusual punishment.245 
IV.  CRUEL AND UNUSUAL? 
The United States Supreme Court has found the exact content 
and scope of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause difficult to 
define.246  The Framers of the Constitution tell us very little as to why 
this clause was included among the enumerated Bill of Rights.247  
 
conceived by a majority of the voting public, is constantly undergoing 
reexamination. 
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Early decisions posited that the Eighth Amendment condemned only 
“manifestly cruel and unusual punishments,” such as “burning at the 
stake, crucifixion, and breaking on the wheel.”248  In Weems v. United 
States,249 however, the Supreme Court denounced this limited 
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, stating “the provision 
would seem to be wholly unnecessary in a free government, since it is 
scarcely possible that [the] government should authorize or justify 
such atrocious conduct.”250  The Court in Weems thus declared that 
punishment of twelve years at hard labor for the crime of falsifying 
official documents was cruel and unusual,251 despite a lack of torture 
or barbarousness.  This rationale has extended the Clause to methods 
of punishment other than those that are blatantly barbaric or 
tortuous.252 
In Trop v. Dulles,253 for example, the Court declared that 
revocation of one’s citizenship as punishment for a crime was cruel 
and unusual, stating that “[c]itizenship is not a license that expires 
upon misbehavior.”254  In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted 
that punishments other than “death, imprisonment, and fines” are 
“constitutionally suspect.”255  The Court declared that the 
determination of what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment 
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that all the disastrous consequences of this fate may not be brought to 
bear on a stateless person.  The threat makes the punishment 
obnoxious. 
Id. at 101-02. 
 255 Id. at 100. 
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cannot be decided by simply deferring to what was historically 
accepted as a method of punishment.256  The Clause “must draw its 
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.”257  Thus, while revocation of one’s 
citizenship was historically permitted as a method of punishment,258 
standards of decency had evolved to where such punishment was no 
longer acceptable.259 
In Furman v. Georgia,260 Justice Brennan provided four principles 
for courts to examine when determining whether a particular 
punishment is unconstitutional for failing to meet society’s standards 
of decency.261  The overriding principle, explained the Justice, is that 
“a punishment must not by its severity be degrading to human 
dignity.”262  In addition, courts should consider whether the 
punishment is arbitrarily imposed;263 whether the punishment is 
excessive in the sense that it is unnecessary;264 and whether 
contemporary society would find the punishment unacceptable.265  
Justice Brennan noted that a particular form of punishment was 
unlikely to stand in blatant violation of any one of these principles.266  
Rather, a cumulative analysis of all four principles is necessary to 
determine a punishment’s constitutionality.267 
An analysis of ex-felon disenfranchisement under the four 
principles espoused by Justice Brennan in Furman supports the 
conclusion that such punishment is not in conformity with societal 
standards of decency and is thus, cruel and unusual.268  It must be 
remembered that because disenfranchisement does not fit within the 
traditional modes of punishment — death, imprisonment, or fines — 
it is already “constitutionally suspect.”269 
First, the severity of a provision that permanently denies the 
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franchise to citizens who have paid their debt to society does not 
comport with notions of human dignity.270  Similar to the punishment 
of denaturalization, disenfranchisement “involves a denial by society 
of the individual’s existence as a member of the human 
community.”271 
Second, the arbitrary selection of crimes that result in a loss of 
ones voting rights further indicates that disenfranchisement does not 
measure up to society’s standards of decency.  There is no consistency 
in a law that would deny the right to vote to persons convicted of 
abusing a female child, for example, yet impose no such denial on 
those convicted of abusing male children.272 
Third, because it has not been demonstrated that 
disenfranchisement is necessary to achieve any legitimate state 
interest,273 those provisions are “nothing more than the pointless 
infliction of suffering.”274  Disenfranchisement is thus excessive in 
that a citizen’s ability to exercise a fundamental right is obliterated 
without any benefit provided to society. 
Finally, although the vote was once regarded as a right granted 
by the state to only those deemed worthy of its possession,275 the 
contemporary view posits that voting is a fundamental right, one that 
is “preservative of all [other] rights.”276  This final point is reinforced 
by an examination of the following two cases. 
In Green v. Bd. of Elections,277 decided in 1967, an ex-felon 
challenged New York’s disenfranchisement provisions as, inter alia, a 
violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.278  After 
summarily dismissing disenfranchisement as a punitive measure, the 
court added that even if imposed as punishment, disenfranchisement 
would not be cruel and unusual because it was not offensive to the 
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“evolving standards of decency” of society.279  In support of this 
conclusion, the court noted that forty-two states had provisions in 
effect at that time denying the vote to persons convicted of a criminal 
offense.280  From this, the court concluded that society’s standards of 
decency were not offended by this practice.281 
The Green court’s conclusion that 1967 America was not 
offended by the disenfranchisement of felons was a correct 
interpretation and application of Trop.282  The fact that forty-two 
states disenfranchised those convicted of crime in 1967 was 
overwhelming evidence that society did not consider felon 
disenfranchisement offensive.  Rather, national opinion clearly 
endorsed such disenfranchisement.283 
More recently, the Supreme Court declared the execution of 
mentally retarded defendants to be cruel and unusual punishment in 
Atkins v. Virginia.284  The defendant in Atkins was convicted of murder 
and sentenced to death,285 despite evidence that he was mentally 
retarded and thus less culpable than a killer of ordinary 
intelligence.286  The Virginia Supreme Court upheld Atkins’ death 
sentence, rejecting the contention that the mentally retarded could 
not be executed.287 
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that “in 
light of our ‘evolving standards of decency,’” such punishment was 
forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.288  In reaching this conclusion, 
the Court examined objective indicators of contemporary values,289 
“the clearest and most reliable of [which] is the legislation enacted by 
the country’s legislatures.”290  The Court noted that prior to 1986, 
none of the states that permitted capital punishment prohibited the 
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execution of a mentally retarded offender.291  In June of that year, 
however, the public outcry following the execution of a mentally 
retarded murderer in Georgia292 led eighteen states to pass laws 
forbidding such executions.293  Relying primarily on the “large” 
number of states that had recently passed such legislation,294 
combined with the “overwhelming” passage rate of the legislation and 
the infrequency with which the mentally retarded were executed in 
those states that permitted such executions,295 the Court concluded 
that the practice of executing the retarded had “become truly 
unusual, and it is fair to say that a national consensus has developed 
against it.”296 
A similar national consensus has developed against the 
punishment of disenfranchising ex-felons.297  While forty-eight states 
currently deny the vote to offenders under some form of state or 
federal supervision,298 only nine of these states continue to exclude ex-
offenders from the franchise.299  The country’s legislatures — the 
“clearest and most reliable” indicators employed by the Court in 
gauging society’s standards of decency300 — have thus clearly declared 
that society no longer condones the exclusion of citizens from the 
ballot once their debt to society has been paid.301  Moreover, under 
the reasoning of Green, the fact that forty-one states now allow ex-
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felons to vote overwhelmingly indicates that societal standards of 
decency are no longer offended by the participation of ex-felons in 
elections.  To the contrary, society has evolved to where the denial of 
the franchise to ex-felons no longer measures up to the standards of 
decency of 2002 America.  As such, the disenfranchisement of ex-
felons constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and is violative of 
the Eighth Amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
The disenfranchisement of individuals who have paid their debt 
to society is nothing more than additional punishment for the 
conviction of certain crimes.  There is simply no merit in the 
contention that a state’s electoral process is somehow threatened by 
allowing these otherwise eligible citizens the right to vote. 
Supporters of disenfranchisement have failed to show how the 
ex-felon’s past infraction is in any way indicative of his inability to 
lawfully participate in the electoral process.  The exclusion of all ex-
felons from voting for fear they might commit election crime makes 
no more sense than would a law forbidding all ex-felons from driving 
for fear they might drive recklessly.  There is no reason to think that 
elections are less reliable because of ex-felon participation, or that 
occasional voter misconduct committed by these individuals cannot 
be effectively managed by a state’s election laws.  Rather, 
disenfranchisement is a remnant of the past, carried forward into 
modernity with the same punitive purpose that these laws served in 
ancient times. 
Because the United States Supreme Court has precluded the 
more applicable equal protection challenge302 to a restriction that 
“strike[s] at the heart of representative government,”303 the Eighth 
Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause must be 
employed to remove this obstacle to “universal” suffrage.  As 
demonstrated, the disenfranchisement of ex-felons is cruel and 
unusual because it fails to measure up to the standards of decency 
that have evolved in modern America.  That a national consensus has 
developed against such disenfranchisement is clearly confirmed by 
the forty-one states that no longer condone the practice, electing 
instead to include ex-felons in their electoral process. 
There is no question that crime is a serious matter, and criminals 
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must be required to pay for their indiscretions against society.  Yet 
there is no reason to extend this debt beyond the individual’s 
judicially imposed sentence.  Like the right of citizenship, the right to 
vote should not “expire[] upon misbehavior.”304  Joe Smith and 
thousands of others like him have turned their lives around after 
their convictions and become productive members of society.  These 
men and women are active in our communities, contributing to our 
economy and making the nation a better place to live.  As such, they 
should be relieved of this “scarlet letter” and allowed to completely 
rejoin society as voting citizens.  Their exclusion from the franchise 
only serves as a divisive reminder that the ex-felon is not entirely one 
of “us.”  While the nation has made great strides by securing the vote 
to persons once considered unworthy or incapable of exercising this 
fundamental right, the denial of the franchise to individuals who 
have paid their debt to society demonstrates that the journey is not 
yet complete. 
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